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In responding to Ms. Finsen's comments on my 
paper, I am struck once again by how difficult it is to 
keep deliberation upon the ideal separate from utilitarian 
considerations. And although I feel that Ms. Finsen in 
her comments does not always succeed in doing this 
(or perhaps does not value the attempt) I am grateful 
for her criticism, which is obviously propelled by a 
fierce regard for animals. I have taken up my subject 
out of desperation about the fate of laboratory and 
factory farm animals and out of a deep admiration for 
humans pure and determined enough to put themselves 
in danger in order to rescue animals. I have attempted 
in my paper, however. to avoid any discussion peripheral 
to the point of whether the act of animal liberation can 
have a claim to validity. 
I. Structural Violence 
Ms. Finsen reacts sharply to my assertion that in 
structural violence the actor/act/victim relationship is 
broken, and that the perpetrator of violence must not 
be its author and that not the perpetrator is to be sought, 
but rather the system must be changed. Ms. Finsen 
cites my example of hunger in Ethiopia and rightly 
remarks that the fact that we all know why it is 
happening implicates us in the violence. She brings 
her own example of theExxon spill and pleads here for 
the punishment of the corporate executives for their part 
in the disaster. But why only the captain of the ship or 
the president of the company? What about the 
stockholders who are the financial supporters and the 
beneficiaries of Exxon? What about all of us who use 
oil and gasoline every day, who pollute our environment 
and don't care in the least what this means for future 
generations, or-ifwe care-still continue to use fossil 
fuel? We are all guilty, so how shall we be punished? 
Putting the president of Exxon in jail does not speak to 
the Exxon spill. It is a case of amputating the dangling 
legs of sleepers to make them fit in the inadequate bed 
of common law. What about all the meat-eaters who 
are implicated in the hunger in Ethiopia, who not only 
know what the connections are, but continue their 
destructive behavior? How shall we punish them? 
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Who shall be put in jail for the crimes against the 
people of Ethiopia? 
Ms. Finsen remarks. "In discussing the killing of a 
healthy baboon in a laboratory experiment, Liszt says 
that 'the agent which transported the violence is the 
structure of science itself.' But this is only partially 
right, for without individual willing experimenters no 
baboons can be killed." But also this is only partly 
right, for without us taxpayers and tablet-swallowers. 
no experimenter would have work. Ms. Finsen's 
procrustean solution is to hold some people responsible 
for the sins of the multitude because the multitude 
cannot be accommodated by the legal system. But this 
will only create scapegoats. And the system will only 
accommodate itself to this little attack through the 
institution of liability insurance, etc. 
Ms. Finsen rightly points out that at the Nuremberg 
Trials individuals were hanged for their crimes. I'm 
sure I needn't point out the fact that thousands went 
unpunished and tens of thousands were implicated in 
ways that might not be punishable: giving information 
to the SS about the whereabouts of Jewish families; 
not offering water to a thirsting prisoner, jeering at a 
wearer of the yellow star; not wearing the yellow star 
oneself as a sign of solidarity; not hiding a Jewish 
person; not writing outraged letters to the newspapers; 
not circulating flyers; taking up an academic position 
vacated by a Jew carried off to the camps; buying a 
house for a pittance which had been seized by the Nazis 
from a Jewish family. The list is long and tragic. The 
hangings of the few Nazis, who were picked out of the 
mass of war criminals. can only be understood as the 
expression of outrage and desperation. It was not 
classic justice. The condemned were certainly guilty. 
But they were also scapegoats. Germans today speak 
sardonically of the executions, because the war 
criminals still live among us here in Germany and the 
majority continued unscathed in their climb to the top 
of society. I used the example of the Nuremberg Trials 
to show that the laws of the land may be immoral, that 
individuals may be more moral than the laws of the 
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land, and that resistance to immoral laws must be 
treated differently than resistance to moral laws. 
II. Defending the Liberation ofAnimals 
Ms. Finsen says she has difficulty understanding my 
"terminology" although I have used standard defInitions 
for the terms I have used where I have not specifically 
defined them otherwise. 
I do, in fact, mean by the term "liberation" the 
physical removal of animals from danger, the removal 
"from harm's way." 
1. Legitimacy 
By "valid" I mean "well-founded and particularly 
applicable to the particular matter or circumstances" 
(Oxford English Dictionary, 1975, p. 3586). With the 
word "legitimate" I mean "conformable to law or rule; 
sanctioned or authorized by law or right; lawful; proper" 
(op. cit., p. 1600). By "law" and "right" I mean the 
deepest and oldest sense of the words: natural law and 
natural right as recognized at the Nuremberg Trials and 
which, as I have tried to demonstrate, logically extend 
to animals. 
Ms. Finsen's claim that "that the Nazis could be held 
responsible for their crimes has something to do with 
the fact that they were violating a quite universally held 
principle" is, frrstly, clearly untrue-the Nazis and the 
German people for instance did not hold to this 
principle-and, secondly, an invalid conclusion. 
"Universally held principles" may be the basis for brute 
force or "Faustrecht" but are not the basis for 
determining the morality of an act 
2. Necessity 
The "necessity" of which I speak here-as I have 
tried to demonstrate by referring to the animal 
liberator's "more demanding moral framework" and 
her "press of necessity"-is that necessity which only 
becomes operant after a certain level of awareness is 
reached. It is the "necessity" which I feel to keep meat 
out of my body and house but which my neighbor Herr 
Wedekind does not feel. I have not made a statement 
to the effect that everyone is required to free animals, 
but that for the liberator, it has become a necessity. 
Ms. Finsen repeatedly stresses in her reply to this 
section that we are all complicit in structural violence. 
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Given that we are not feral, this is true by defInition 
and the very proof of my assertion that our legal 
apparatus is inadequate to cope with structural violence. 
Ms. Finsen stresses her belief that boycott and 
passive resistance are more effective measures in 
changing the structures of violence. But judging 
methods of changing the structures is clearly not my 
theme. I am judging animal liberation on the variables 
of legitimacy, necessity, and aptness as a method of 
righting the wrong being done to the individual animal 
at rislc. Hiding a Jewish family in the attic in 1944 in 
Hamburg was not an effective means of challenging 
fascist ideology. But it was the only effective solution 
for its victims. 
3. Aptness 
Ms. Finsen rightly remarks that animal liberation is 
at least the most effective means to prevent injustice to 
the particular animals involved. I have not tried to claim 
more. Whether it is also effective in bringing the 
problem of animal abuse before the public or whether 
it may be a counterproductive measure in the end, 
bringing the animal rights movement into the realm of 
terrorism, is not my theme. Utilitarian considerations 
are inappropriate to a paper concerned with the 
"rightness" of animal liberation. These tactical 
deliberations belong to discussions within the various 
animal rights groups. 
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